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HOW THE POOR (AND NOT-SO-POOR) SAVED:  




The savings bank was one of several schemes conjured by social 
reformers in industrializing Britain to encourage the poor to greater thrift.  
Such schemes were particularly directed at ‘industrious and frugal’ servants 
and tradesmen, and more generally at those who might be reduced to 
destitution by unemployment, illness, or old age.  Saving for a rainy day 
might have been second nature to the businessman and the farmer; not so the 
labourer or the servant.  One early proponent claimed that saving was not ‘an 
intuitive faculty of the mind’, but needed to be taught, like reading and 
writing.1   
From humble beginnings in a cottage in lowland Scotland in 1810, 
savings banks spread rapidly throughout the U.K.  The concept also quickly 
caught on in the United States.  In both hemispheres it became fashionable for 
the rich and powerful to help savings banks as patrons or part-time 
managers.2  In Ireland too the banks relied on local elites, usually ecumenical 
in composition, to provide the initiative and to act as trustees or managers.3  
The desire to make the poor industrious was coupled with a self-interested 
concern to reduce the nuisances of street begging and ‘the evils of the system 
of poor laws’.4 The link between saving and pauperism made some of those 
targeted by the philanthropists suspicious.  Confusing intent and outcome, 
they saw the banks as a sinister ploy to keep down wages and abolish the 
poor laws.   
In both the U.K. and the U.S. the new institutions won legislative 
support.  As a confidence building measure, in 1816 the London parliament 
stipulated that the banks’ savings be re-deposited with the Commissioners for 
the Reduction of the National Debt, who would pay a generous 3d per cent 
per diem or 4.55 per cent per annum on them.5  In order to prevent abuse by 
the not-so-poor, depositors were limited to investments of £50 per annum in   2
Ireland and £100 in Britain.  Against the objection that the legislation had not 
been demanded by those whom it sought to protect, its leading proponent 
George Rose M.P. argued that ‘both the principle and the detail of such an 
institution was beyond the common ideas of persons engaged in daily and 
manual labour’6. 
The new banks promised their clients three things: a relatively 
attractive return on their savings, considerable liquidity, and security.  In time 
they would spawn a large, mainly commemorative and celebratory 
historiography, written for the most part by either past employees or specially 
commissioned authors.  Four decades ago, however, ‘outsider’ Albert Fishlow 
struck an iconoclastic note when he characterised the early savings banks in 
England as not living up to the aims of their philanthropic founders.  His 
critique, though striking at the time, was not new: the accusation was 
common in the early decades of the savings bank movement.  Fishlow, 
however, was the first to effectively marshal quantitative data to show that in 
England at least comfortably off people savers quickly ‘captured’ the new 
institutions for their own gains.7  In America, it would seem, it was a different 
story, for more than a decade ago George Alter, Claudia Goldin, and Elyse 
Rotella described the deposits held in the very different setting of antebellum 
Philadelphia as ‘the savings of ordinary Americans’.8  
   This paper offers a comparative perspective on savings behaviour in 
the U.K. and the U.S.  It marshals both aggregate data and the individual-level 
records of two very different savings banks.9  These are the Thurles Savings 
Bank, located in southern Ireland, and the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank 
(or EISB), located in New York’s lower Manhattan.  The two banks could not 
have been more different in some respects.  One held only four thousand 
accounts during its existence, while the other held over ten thousand in its 
first decade.  Most clients of one were country people, while the other was 
located across the street from New York’s city hall.  One lasted only four 
decades, but the other is still thriving after 150 years.  In both cases, however,   3
in the mid-nineteenth century the majority of account-holders were Irishmen 
and Irishwomen.   Contrasting economic and institutional contexts combined 
to produce very different savings banks. 
Part 2 of this paper outlines the early history of savings banks on both 
sides of the Atlantic.  Part 3 describes the records of the TSB and the EISB.  
Part 4 describes the savings behaviour they imply.  Part 5 profiles the savers, 
with Fishlow’s critique in mind.  Part 6 concludes. 
 
 
2. BEGINNINGS AND DIFFUSION 
  By the end of 1818 Great Britain contained nearly five hundred savings 
banks.  The rate of growth tapered off thereafter, and most of the savings 
banks still in existence in mid-century had been established by the early 
1820s.10  Ireland’s first successful bank opened for business in Belfast in 
January 1816.  Diffusion lagged Britain by only a year or two, but the Irish 
savings bank network was essentially in place by the mid-1820s.11  Of the 
seventy-four banks still open in late 1846 forty-six had been created in 1816-
25, a further twenty-one in 1826-35, and only seven from 1836 on.  The spread 
in Ireland was less spectacular than in Britain. On the eve of the Great Famine 
(1846-1852) Ireland contained more than twice as many people as Scotland 
but only half as many savings banks; England and Wales had less than double 
Ireland’s population, but six times as many savings banks.  Alternatively, 
while England and Wales had about £1.7 deposited per inhabitant, Ireland 
had only £0.3.  Nonetheless in late 1846 the £2.9 million held by 93,853 
depositors in seventy-four Irish savings banks exceeded by £0.3 million the 
total held in private deposits in the Bank of Ireland, then by far the largest of 
Ireland’s joint-stock banks.12  In Ireland as in the rest of the U.K. account-
holders were disproportionately urban, with the four main cities holding two-
fifths of all accounts.     4
The growth of the savings bank network in the U.S. was more gradual 
at first.  News from Great Britain was a key element in moves afoot in late 
1816 to create banks in New York, Philadelphia, and Boston.13  In the U.S. 
savings banks still numbered only 61 in 1840, but there were 108 by 1850 and 
278 by 1860.  While the 1850s was a decade of crisis for the savings bank 
movement in the U.K., it was a crucial decade in their spread on the other side 
of the Atlantic.  In New York City the Bank for Savings (established in 1819) 
still held 73 per cent of all accounts and 53 per cent of savings as late as 1848, 
but a wave of new savings banks drove those percentages down to 24 and 21 
by 1861.  By 1860 New York City’s nineteen savings banks held deposits of 
over $40 million, or $50 (about £10) per inhabitant, dwarfing the average 
deposited per inhabitant in Ireland or in Britain around the same time.  Most 
banks were located in New England and in the Middle Atlantic states: vast 
swathes of the west and south still contained none.14 
As in the U.K. the promoters of the new savings banks tended to be 
people of considerable standing.15  Moreover, the same individualist 
philanthropy that underpinned middle-class support for the banks in the U.K. 
was also at work in the New World. Evangelical fervour was sometimes 
behind the efforts to help the poor help themselves: several of those who 
encouraged seamen to ‘save’ as directors of the Seamen’s Bank were also 
directors of a society aimed at ‘saving’ seamen, while the advent of the 
Provident Institution for Savings in Boston was presaged in a small weekly 
called The Christian Disciple.16  Yet clergymen (and landowners) were less to 
the fore in establishing and running banks in the New World setting than in 
the Old.  Even when—as in the case of the EISB—clergymen were 
instrumental in a bank’s foundation, they tended to keep well away from its 
management or day-to-day operations. 
  The elites who created and managed the early savings banks saw 
themselves (or, in some cases, merely presented themselves) moral crusaders 
who regarded their creations as vehicles for moral reform.  Though   5
philanthropy was the dominant factor, some promoted savings banks with an 
eye to personal gain.  This was certainly more a factor in the U.S. than in the 
U.K.  Some of the main movers behind the New York Bank for Savings 
(established in 1819) were also supporters of the capital-starved Erie Canal 
project.  In the first decade or so of its existence the bank’s savers in effect 
subsidised canal building.17  Several promoters of the Bowery Bank also 
combined ‘philanthropy’ with financial gain. The short-lived Knickerbocker 
Savings Bank performed the same role for the Knickerbocker Bank, and when 
the latter failed in 1854 it dragged the former down with it.18   
In America savings banks, individually chartered under state law, were 
given greater discretion over the range of assets held and the rate of interest 
paid.  In 1818 the state of Maryland granted the Savings Bank of Baltimore a 
charter giving it complete discretion over its portfolio.  In 1831-2 New York 
State gave the Poughkeepsie Savings Bank and the Brooklyn Savings Bank 
legal permission to lend on bond and property mortgages. Such lending 
would bulk large later, though runs sparked by the panics of 1837, 1854, and 
1857 taught the banks to be cautious.   
  Another significant difference between U.S. and U.K. savings banks 
was the far higher interest rate paid by the former on deposits. In mid-century 
5-6 per cent was typical, almost double the rate paid by the typical U.K. 
savings bank.  The higher return on bonds and mortgage loans in the New 
World allowed (or forced) American banks to be more generous to their 
depositors, though it also left them more vulnerable to panics.  However, the 
margin between lending and borrowing rates (about one per cent) in the U.S. 
was greater than the margin taken up by operating costs in the U.K.19 
 
 
3. NEW YORK, THURLES, AND BEYOND 
  The EISB began to accept deposits in rented premises at 51 Chambers 
Street (across the road from New York’s City Hall) on 30th September 1850.    6
An outgrowth of the Irish Emigrant Society, the bank was the brainchild of 
the Catholic bishop of New York, John Joseph Hughes, and a group of leading 
Irish-born businessmen.  Hughes, born in Ireland in 1797, had lived in the 
U.S. since 1817.  For a community mostly new to urban life and to savings 
banks, his influence probably lent the new institution the credibility it needed 
to survive.   
  New York was already a world-class city by this time.  Its port was 
responsible for 36 per cent of U.S. imports and 69 per cent of exports.20  On the 
eve of the civil war over one in five of its population of eight hundred 
thousand was Irish-born, and the Irish formed an even higher proportion of 
its labour force.  In the early years the EISB’s depositors were overwhelmingly 
Irish, many of them recent immigrants, but as it expanded it became a more 
cosmopolitan institution.  By the mid-1850s German immigrants, many of 
them Jewish, and Irish-Americans accounted for about one-tenth of the 
accounts. On the eve of the civil war the EISB had ten thousand depositors, or 
about one in twenty of the Irish-born population of New York and Brooklyn, 
but a much higher proportion of those in the age-groups supplying most of 
the savers.21 
    The Thurles Savings Bank was located in one of the main towns in 
Tipperary, Ireland’s largest inland county.  Tipperary’s economy was 
dominated by agriculture: on the eve of the Great Famine (1846-52) its male 
labour force of 125,000 included 26,000 farmers and 70,000 farm labourers.22  
Thurles then contained nearly eight thousand people.  Its industrial base was 
narrow and depended on agricultural raw materials, while its commercial 
banking needs were met by branches of the National Bank and the Tipperary 
Bank.23  Its ‘big chapel’, built at a cost of £10,000 in the 1800s had standing-
room accommodation for seven to eight thousand persons, while its 
workhouse served an area of nearly two hundred square miles around the 
town from 1842 on.     7
  Thurles was poor relative to other Tipperary towns: John Henry 
Newman (the future Cardinal Newman) described it after a visit in 1851 as 
‘squalid’, and scuppered plans to seat the proposed Catholic University there.  
Yet its rapid population growth in the pre-famine period—from 6,040 in 1821 
to 7,523 in 1841—implies progress of sorts.  By the same token the impact of 
the Famine on Thurles and the surrounding area was severe.  Between 1841 
and 1851 nearly three thousand people died in the town’s workhouse.  The 
population of the town fell in the 1850s, and then stagnated at around five 
thousand between 1861 and 1881.  It bears noting that housing conditions 
were better and literacy rates higher in the surrounding and neighbouring 
parishes than in Thurles.24 
  The Thurles Savings Bank (hereinafter TSB) was established in 1829, 
some years after the main wave of Irish savings banks, and lasted until 1871.  
The decision to create the bank was taken at a meeting on 8 October 1829 of 
‘those Gentlemen who are disposed to lend their Aid...for the Benefit of the 
Town and Neighbourhood ’.  The bank opened for business two months later.  
Its trustees and managers were mainly local clergymen, landed proprietors, 
and professional people.25  The TSB was fortunate in its personnel, both 
unpaid and paid.   Most of its officers were long serving.  Between 1829 and 
1859 it had only three treasurers (after which the National Bank fulfilled the 
function), and a local shopkeeper and stationer served as part-time actuary 
from beginning to end, on a salary that varied with the volume of business.  
However, only a minority of the twenty trustees nominated at the outset 
played any significant part in TSB’s operations, and some seem never to have 
attended a quarterly trustees’ meeting.  In effect at any one time the bank was 
run by a group of six to eight people, and attendance at the trustees’ quarterly 
meetings rarely exceeded five or six. 
  The savings banks’ annual returns as reported in Thom’s Almanac offer 
some indispensable comparative perspective on the TSB.  They suggest that 
on the eve of the famine the bank was representative of banks in towns its   8
size, both within Tipperary and in Ireland as a whole.   According to Thom’s 
on 20 November 1846 the TSB had £31,815 deposited in 892 accounts.  The 
average sum on deposit, £35 13s 4d, was on the high side, exceeded by only 
seven of a total of seventy-six banks (the average for the country as a whole 
was £30 8s).  A feature was the particularly high percentage of savers in the 
£20-£50 bracket: 52 per cent of all accounts in Thurles, against 38 per cent 
nationally in November 1846.  The TSB was badly hit by contagion-induced 
panics in 1848 and 1856, but it was greater competition from joint stock banks 
and the post office savings bank in the 1860s that led to its quiet demise. 
 
 
3. CHARACTERISTICS OF SAVERS AND ACCOUNTS 
  Some of the differences between the TSB and the EISB were a function 
of relative size.  The TSB opened for only two hours a week, while the EISB 
was open six days a week.  The TSB relied in the main on unpaid workers, 
while the EISB employed salaried staff.  The TSB borrowed a room used 
mainly for other purposes, while the EISB boasted a proper banking office.  
The ledgers of the two banks reveal other similarities and differences.  
Uniquely for Ireland, the records of TSB survive almost in their entirety.26  
The earliest transactions of the bank are of special interest.  Rather 
inauspiciously, on its opening day (14 December 1829) the bank attracted no 
custom though three trustees opened accounts with token deposits of £1 each.  
A week later one Bridget Shea became the first real customer, and she 
accompanied her deposit of £30 with three others of the same amount for 
other family members.  A week later one Michael Mullally of Thurles 
deposited £7.  Bridget Shea returned with another £30 on 4 January 1830, this 
time in the name of a nine-year old niece, while one trustee opened another 
trust account for his two year-old son Thomas.  Thereafter deposits by 
founding trustees became rarer and those of the likes of Bridget Ryan more 
typical.27  Over its lifetime the TSB received £187,057 10s 6d in deposits.  In all   9
4,213 accounts were opened in the names of individuals, as well as another 
fifty-one representing voluntary organisations or charitable institutions.  More 
than half of the accounts were opened before the end of 1845. 
  Both openings and closing were subject to clustering, mainly prompted 
by exogenous events.  In March 1835 twenty-three accounts closed, a monthly 
total equalled in April 1840 and February 1845, but not exceeded until April 
1847, when fifty-four accounts closed.  The 1835 closures may have been 
prompted by establishment of a branch of the National Bank in the town, and 
those of April 1840 by the opening of a branch of the Tipperary Bank.  If the 
105 closures in January 1871 are excluded, the highest monthly totals of 
closures were caused by panics in the spring of 1848 and in early 1856. 
Several features of the TSB accounts are noteworthy.  Male accounts 
outnumbered female, though not strikingly so (by 2,387 to 1,826).  The 
average opening balance in male accounts exceeded that in female by £19 14s 
to £17 8s:  a very slender margin, given the big gender gap in earnings in 
nineteenth-century Ireland.  Since the number of transactions per account was 
small a significant share of the withdrawing and depositing of money was 
done through opening and closing accounts.   
  A striking feature is that more than one-third of the opening deposits 
were for exactly the maximum permitted sum of £30 (Figure 1).  Savers 
opening their accounts with a deposit of less than £2 included three labourers, 
thirty-eight servants, seven bakers, and two farmers.  Savers opening with an 
even £30 included seven labourers, eight servants, one baker, 311 farmers, and 
296 other members identified as belong to farming households. 
  Accounts held in trust were an important feature of the TSB.  Most 
were in the names of farmers, farmers’ wives, or their grown-up sons and 
daughters.  The practice of opening (and, in due course, closing) several trust 
accounts on the same day in the names of family members presented a way 
round the regulation that no single account be augmented by more that £30 in 
a single year.  It is also significant that the opening deposits in trust accounts   10
tended to be bigger than average.  Only 8.5 per cent of them were of £5 or 
under, compared to 18.5 per cent of all opening deposits.  Moreover, nearly 
three-fifths (57.2 per cent) of the opening deposits of exactly £30 were trust 
accounts, and a much higher proportion of trust accounts (52.6 per cent) were 
at the upper limit of £30.  The occupational backgrounds of about one-third of 
those acting as trustees are given, and about half of them were farmers or 
farmers’ wives.   
   Trust accounts accounted for over one third of all accounts.  The 
average opening balance of a trust account was considerably larger than that 
of other accounts (£23 against £16.5).  In the ledgers a clear majority of 
trustees are noted as related to the accounts they supported; and the great 
majority of these were parents.  As might be expected, certain occupations 
featured disproportionately among the trustees.  Thus priestly trustees 
outnumbered priestly depositors by over two to one.  While some priests 
acted for kinfolk, most did so for female parishioners.  Gentlemen, corn-
dealers, medical practitioners, and chemists, most of whom operated trust 
accounts for family members and kinfolk, were also strongly represented.  
The number of farmer trustees described as such also outnumbered the 
number of farmer accounts (by 640 to 574).  However, there were only eight 
servant trustees against 215 servant accounts, six labourer trustees against 
eighty-three labourer accounts, and seventeen police trustees against eighty-
six police accounts.  The bank also held the accounts of about fifty charitable 
associations and societies (mainly religious), and of several schools and 
dispensaries. 
  In the 1829-1846 period annual deposits usually exceeded withdrawals.  
However, in 1834-36 there were substantial withdrawals (£11,265 against 
£14,340 deposited).   This was probably due to the opening of a branch of the 
National Bank in the town in 1835 and a branch of the Agricultural and 
Commercial Bank in the following year.  The opening of a branch of the new   11
Tipperary Bank in 1840 may also have some drawn accounts away from the 
TSB. 
  By the end of the 1850s, the focus of this study, the EISB held twice as 
many accounts as the TSB would hold in its lifetime, and was sixth biggest of 
New York’s eighteen savings banks.  Its rapid growth was briefly interrupted 
by two contagion-driven panics in 1854 and 1857.  Whereas farmers and their 
dependents dominated in the TSB, the account holders of the EISB were more 
representative of New York’s Irish community, if not of the city as a whole.28  
The survival of both banks’ records invites closer analysis of the similarities 
and differences between them. 
 
3.1. Seasonality 
 The opening and closing of accounts in Tipperary were subject to 
marked seasonality. Openings peaked in March (when 13.3 per cent of all 
accounts were opened) and were at a minimum in September (4.3 per cent).  
Seasonality was more marked before the famine: the coefficient of variation 
over the twelve months, monthly totals weighted for month length, was 0.38 
in 1830-45 and 0.27 in 1846-70.  Seasonality in opening accounts was more 
pronounced among farmers and their kin, though labourers’ accounts were 
also subject to marked seasonality in this respect.  Spinsters too were inclined 
to open accounts in the early part of the year, perhaps reflecting hiring 
practices.  Closings were also subject to seasonality, though less so than 
openings, and here exogenous events were more a disturbing force.  The 
peaks in closings in March-April (when over 22.3 per cent accounts closed) 
are partly due to the timing of the panics of 1848 and 1856.  Closings were 
fewest in August (six per cent of the total).  
In the case of the EISB drafts were subject to much more seasonality 
than deposits, with two major peaks in January and July.  Deposits also 
peaked in July, though much less spectacularly.  The number of accounts 
opened and closed also varied somewhat seasonally.  We still lack a full   12
understanding of these patterns, but the striking bi-annual peaks in 
withdrawals are a reflection of a form of ‘coupon-clipping’:  a significant 
number of depositors regularly withdrew interest payments due without 
touching the principal.  It is worth noting that the seasonal pattern of 
withdrawals from the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society studied by George 
Alter, Claudia Goldin, and Elyse Rotella29 was quite different.  
 
3.2. Geography 
  The impact of geography on the banks’ clienteles is also of interest.  
Most TSB account-holders would have made their way to their bank by foot 
or by horse and car: public transport would have been of little use.  This kept 
the catchment area of the bank relatively small.  Over two-fifths of all account 
holders lived in the parish of Thurles or at most two or three miles from the 
bank.  Another thirty-eight per cent lived in the ring of five parishes 
surrounding the town.  A further thirteen per cent lived in an outer ring of 
seven parishes within eight to ten miles of the town.30  The remaining six per 
cent either lived further away or gave no identifiable addresses.  Distance also 
influenced the average number of deposits and withdrawals.  The averages in 
Thurles itself (5.8 and 2.3, respectively) were double those in the outer ring of 
parishes (2.5 and 1.2).  The average annual number of transactions was subject 
to a shoe-leather effect: account holders in the town of Thurles itself were 
much more likely to visit the bank than those living in its hinterland. 
In New York too distance mattered.   Half of all depositors lived below 
Houston Street, or within a mile or two of the bank.  Another 22 per cent lived 
on Manhattan north of Houston, while further fourteen per cent more gave 
addresses in Brooklyn, New Jersey, or Staten Island, and six per cent lived in 
upstate New York.  The number of transactions varied with distance, though 
less so than in Thurles.  Though accounts outside the immediate 
neighbourhood of the EISB were subject to fewer deposits or withdrawals (9.3 
versus 10.3), though they were held for about two months longer on average.   13
 
3.3. Age and Gender 
   The TSB’s actuary noted the ages of many account holders in the pre-
famine period, though hardly any after 1845.  Age data for the 1860s survive 
in the EISB’s ‘signature books’.  The very different age distributions in Table 1 
are in part the product of the different demographic profiles of the two 
communities, but also a by-product of practise of TSB account holders of 
opening extra accounts in the names of children and juveniles in order to 
circumvent the rules on maximum deposits (see below).  The predominance 
of immigrants among EISB savers also probably explains why in Philadelphia 
account holders were considerably younger than in New York.31 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
The gender of savers is also of interest.  In Ireland it seems that most 
savers were men, though the female share was almost certainly boosted by 
middle-class households operating several accounts in order to get around 
rules limiting deposit size.  A list of claimants for compensation in the wake 
of the collapse of St. Peter’s Parish Savings Bank suggests that the majority of 
its depositors were women.  This must be partly a reflection of Dublin’s 
demography, where women accounted for 58.2 per cent of those in their 
twenties, 56.4 per cent of those in their thirties, and 55.3 per cent of those in 
their forties. Women were particularly numerous among the smaller account-
holders.  Over two-thirds of those depositors holding £20 or less were women, 
but women accounted for only fifty-six per cent of those holding £30 or 
more.32   
 
  
4. ACCUMULATE, ACCUMULATE? 
To what extent did account-holders use the savings banks as vehicles 
of accumulation?  The EISB accounts suggest a range of savings patterns.   14
Some savers made small and frequent deposits and allowed them to 
accumulate.  Others made substantial and frequent deposits and withdrawals, 
never allowing more than a small balance to remain at Chambers Street.  Still 
more simply allowed an initial balance to accumulate interest or withdrew the 
interest as it accrued.  Compare the case of Ann Murphy who, inexplicably, 
withdrew the $85 she had deposited on 9 August 1854 a day later, and that of 
Mary Kelly, a washerwoman, who deposited $140 in February 1855 and 
withdrew $500 in May 1869, after making many withdrawals and deposits in 
the bank.  Table 2 shows that the image of account holders building up nest 
eggs, which they then withdrew as they made an investment in situ or as they 
moved to another place, was far from being the norm.  Fifty-four per cent of 
women account holders and fifty-five per cent of the men had added less than 
ten dollars to their original deposits when the account was closed.  By this 
definition of saving the two biggest savers in our database, a priest and a 
farmer, lived in upstate New York, while the biggest female saver was a 
Manhattan boarding-house keeper who added $735 to her account over a six-
month period.  Nor, in contrast with the Philadelphia Saving Fund Society, do 
findings reveal that women savers were more likely to accumulate nest eggs 
than men. 
 
[TABLES 2 AND 3 ABOUT HERE] 
  
In the early years the median opening deposit in the EISB was $70, not 
an insignificant sum (about one-third of a male laborer’s annual income in 
1850).  About one deposit in four was under $30, while the single biggest 
deposit was $5,850.33   As might be expected, on average women deposited 
less than men (see Table 3).  Seventy-one per cent of women’s initial deposits 
were less than $100, but only fifty-two per cent of men’s.  The median opening 
deposits by provincial origin in Ireland (Ulster $80, Munster $50, Leinster $70, 
Connacht $73) loosely reflected the relative wealth of the provinces, while the   15
medians for the main non-Irish account holders were German $76, British $70, 
and American $90.  The median unskilled worker began with $65, the median 
semi-skilled with $70, and the median professional with $100.  The median 
housewife (i.e. a married woman declaring no occupation, or merely that of 
her husband) opened her account with $75.34  Such numbers imply that many 
account-holders had already acquired the saving habit before the creation of 
the EISB. 
  Two EISB accounts in five closed within one year of opening, and 
nearly another one in five within two years, while only one account in three 
was kept open for more than three years.35  The median number of deposits 
was two, and the median number of withdrawals was three.  Overall, in this 
respect our analysis replicates Alter et al.’s finding for Philadelphia in 1850 of 
accounts opened as ‘relatively large in size, brief in duration, and inactive’.36 
Table 4 describes the results of an analysis of the determinants of 
saving patterns of EISB account holders in the 1850s.  The covariates on which 
we have information concern family status, occupation, country of birth, and 
years in the United States when the account was opened.  The coefficients 
measure marginal effects.  Thus, for example, in column [2] the measured 
effect of being a woman (FEMALE) on the size of the opening deposit 
(STDEPOSIT) is -$41.163, while the effect of living outside New York 
(OUTNYC) on total deposits (TOTALDEP) in column [3] is $112.82.  It is 
apparent that the numbers of deposits and withdrawals made (NODEPS and 
NOWITHS) were mainly functions of the duration of the account and its 
starting size.  However, labourers, semi-skilled workers, professionals, and 
housewives made considerably more deposits and fewer withdrawals than 
the presumably heterogeneous control group of those listing no occupation or 
too young to have one.  British-born account holders made fewer deposits and 
more withdrawals than the rest, though this effect lessened with the length of 
their stay in America. (gbyus).  The impact of nationality on the first deposit is 
marked: in this respect being Irish-, British-, and German-born reduced the   16
mean sum deposited by between seventy and one hundred dollars.  However, 
length of stay (daysopen) moderated the impact of place of birth: a decade’s 
stay increased the opening German deposit by $103, and the opening Irish 
deposit by $33.  Note too the strong negative impact of gender n both opening 
deposit and total sum deposited.  Column [6] suggests that housewives 
(houswife) were more likely to accumulate through the EISB, and immigrants 
(irl, gb, ger, othereur) less likely to do so. 
The picture in Thurles too is of rather inactive accounts, with an 
average of one or two transactions a year, with the number of lodgements 
typically exceeding withdrawals.  Here we focus on the pre-famine period, 
when the bank was most active.  The average closing balance exceeded the 
average opening balance in all occupational categories.  This suggests that the 
bank was used as a vehicle for accumulation.  The average account was held 
for about four years, with little variation here across occupations or parishes.  
However, it was not unknown for account-holders to close their accounts and 
re-open another later.  Few robust patterns emerge from an analysis of saving 
patterns in Thurles (Table 5).  However, being female, a spinster, or a minor 
were associated with bigger than average opening balances (of £2.8, £3.8, and 
£6.2, respectively), while being a clergyman or a member of farming family 
(other than a farmer) meant a smaller opening balance.  Trust accounts were 
bigger and the maximum amount held in them tended to be bigger.  Trust 
accounts held in the names of minors (mintrst), farming family members 
(farfamtr), and spinsters (spintrst) were used to save. 
 
[TABLES 4 AND 5 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
5. TARGETTING THE POOR? 
   The early supporters of savings banks everywhere, both inside and 
outside the legislature, identified with the industrious poor.37  From the outset   17
critics pointed to the difficulty of preventing the wealthy from free riding on a 
system intended for the poor.  Such criticisms soon reached the floor of the 
House of Commons.  In 1822 economist David Ricardo M.P., initially an 
ardent supporter of savings banks, proposed an impractical scheme that 
would lock up accumulated savings until old age, and yield a much lower 
rate of interest.  Joseph Hume M.P. and Thomas Atwood M.P. became 
persistent and influential critics of the fiscal burden of savings banks.  
Defenders of generous interest payments asserted the ‘improved morality of 
the lower orders’.38   
  In due course legislation took the criticisms on board by reducing the 
rate of interest and the maximum deposit per account.  In 1824 the maximum 
deposit in the first year was reduced to £50 and that in further years to £30.  In 
1828 the ceiling on savings accounts was reduced to £150, and the rate of 
interest paid by the National Debt Commissioners on savings bank deposits 
cut from the original 4.56 per cent to 3.8 per cent in 1828.  It was cut further to 
3.25 per cent in 1844, enabling most savings banks to pay account holders 
between 2.75 and 3 per cent.  Given near zero inflation and the lack of 
alternative outlets for small savings, this was still an attractive rate of return.  
Yet in 1850 expert witnesses before a select committee on middle and working 
class saving declared that savings banks were still little used by working 
men.39 
  Anxious to rebut such criticism and place the U.K. banks in a 
favourable light, their historian Oliver Horne asserted that ‘a few cases of 
deposit by persons for whom the savings bank… was not intended, can easily 
be magnified out of all proportion’, and claimed that ‘from a quarter to a half, 
in the early days, were domestic servants, the remainder mainly artisans, 
small tradesmen, women, and children’.  Horne, whose otherwise very useful 
study is marred by its apologetic tone, admitted that labourers were few, but 
‘the number of richer people depositing was not substantial’, and ‘the 
statutory limits of deposit prevented any serious abuse’.40      18
So how wide was the gap between aspiration and practice?  The 
profiles of account holders by occupational group in mid-century, described 
in Table 7, are particularly telling in this respect.  Had the savings banks been 
mainly about  ‘encouraging and rewarding the industry and self-denial of the 
working classes’41, savers in categories IV (labourers, servants, journeymen), 
and V (domestic servants, nurses, dressmakers, and female artisans) should 
have dominated.  In England and Wales these two combined accounted for 43 
per cent of deposits and 39 per cent of accounts.  In Scotland they accounted 
for 40 and 38 per cent.  In Ireland, however, they accounted for only 20 and 26 
per cent, respectively.  Variations in the structure of the labour force cannot 
account for the difference.  Tradesmen (a category which includes farmers) 
and women without a reported occupation were proportionately more 
important in Ireland.  Since Irish labourers and servants were much poorer 
than their English or Welsh peers, it is perhaps reassuring to find that those 
who did save, saved less.  However, the high averages in Irish trust accounts 
and in the accounts of minors are striking, as are those of gentlemen and 
professionals.  The high average sums deposited would suggest that in both 
England and Ireland money which would otherwise have been deposited in 
joint-stock or country banks was diverted into the savings banks.42   
Scotland’s savings banks came closest to fulfilling their founders’ 
mission.  The occupational profile of savers was significantly more proletarian 
than south of the border, though it remains true that even in Scotland factory 
workers tended to shun the banks.  In 1856 15 per cent of ‘active’ depositors in 
the massive Savings Bank of Glasgow were servants, seven per cent unskilled 
labourers, five per cent female warehouse workers and seamstresses, twenty-
four per cent ‘mechanics’ or artisans, sixteen per cent minors, and nine per 
cent clerks and warehousemen.  While only three per cent were factory 
workers, this breakdown suggests a more blue-collar clientele than implied by 
Smelser and Fishlow.  An important reason for the difference is that   19
Scotland’s more developed joint-stock banking system competed more 
effectively for the savings of the better off than Ireland’s or England’s. 
Hard evidence on the economic status of those holding accounts in 
Irish savings banks is scarce for the early years. However, the very first 
annual report of the Cork Savings Bank (founded in 1817) noted that many of 
its depositors were too prosperous to deserve its benefits, adding that ‘this 
species of deposits, if continued, would eventually close the Bank, as no 
gentleman could be got to give their time gratuitously as Managers to conduct 
the money dealings of their equals and in many cases their superiors in rank 
and property’.  Qualitative evidence in the 1835-6 Poor Inquiry suggests that 
in Ireland farmers, shopkeepers, and tradesmen were much more likely to use 
the savings banks than labourers, though servants also feature prominently in 
the categories listed.  And so it seems to have remained: in 1849 the local 
gentry ceased funding the small bank in Carrickmacross (county Monaghan), 
because depositors were ‘principally of a class superior to those for whose 
benefit the institution was originally intended’.43   
A ‘classification of depositors’ issued by the Dublin Savings Bank in 
1844 is also interesting in this respect.  The bank sub-divided its 14,211 
depositors into twenty-seven classes.  The variation in average size of deposit 
across the selected classes was not great:  the average of £18.7 deposited by 
2,331 female servants represented the lower end of the scale and the average 
of  £32.5 deposited by the 621 ‘artists, students, and teachers and those 
engaged in scientific pursuits’ the upper end.  In between, ninety hotel and 
lodging-house keepers held an average of £23.2 each, seven hundred ‘law and 
mercantile clerks and scriveners’ an average of £32.2.  Over two thousand 
‘minors’ held an average of £28.44 
Scattered aggregate data offer some firmer clues on savers’ socio-
economic status.  Table 7 compares the average sizes of deposits and 
withdrawals from savings banks.  If the clients of savings banks were mainly 
men and women of modest means who saved incrementally one might expect   20
the average withdrawal to exceed the average deposit.  Nowhere were 
accounts very active; everywhere the number of deposits per account 
exceeded the number of withdrawals.  In both England and Wales and in 
Scotland the average withdrawal was much bigger than the average deposit, 
but this was not so in Ireland.  Note too that the average deposit was highest 
in Ireland by a comfortable margin. 
 
[TABLES 6 AND 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
   Surviving data on sums paid in and drawn out of Irish savings banks 
in the 1820s highlight the sensitivity of accounts to economic conditions.  
They show a sharp drop in net deposits in 1826 and 1827, a reflection of the 
crisis conditions obtaining in those years.  The continuing outflows in 1828 
and 1829 were probably due to the decline in the interest rate on deposits in 
1828.  The trend in average deposit size was up for most of the pre-famine 
period, however, and the aggregate sum deposited in Ireland grew much 
faster than in England between 1833 and 1845, at a rate of nearly six per cent 
per annum.    
  The size-distributions of accounts in individual Irish savings banks also 
suggest that many of them did not cater primarily for the very poor.  The 
distinction between deposits and depositors is apposite here.45  The 43,281 
Irish account holders with deposits of £20 or less in 1845 accounted for over 
two-fifths of savers but for only one-ninth or so of all savings.  Nearly two-
thirds of the savings were held in the 47,318 accounts worth between £20 and 
£100.  Note that on the eve of the famine Irish GDP per capita was £10-£12, 
while a farm labourer’s annual wage averaged £10 or less. 
  In the cities of Dublin and Belfast the preponderance of small accounts 
indeed suggests that people on modest incomes were better represented.  In 
the year ending 20 November 1846 a clear majority of accounts (62 per cent in 
Dublin, 55 per cent in Belfast) contained £20 or less.  However, in Cork and   21
Limerick the proportions holding £20 or less were much lower  – 39 and 36 
per cent.  In the towns of Castlebar and Boyle, located in the impoverished 
west, the proportions were 33 and 36 per cent.46 
  Another of the ironies of the Irish savings bank system is that though it 
was meant to alleviate poverty, the banks were most likely to be located in the 
more developed parts of the country.  On the eve of the famine, the province 
of Connacht, poorest and least urbanised, and about to be devastated by the 
famine, accounted for 17 per cent of the population but only 4 per cent of the 
savings held in savings banks. The correlation across Ireland’s thirty-two 
counties between the average deposit per capita and one common measure of 
living standards, poor law valuation per head, was +0.59.  The correlation 
between a second measure, male literacy in a county, and average deposit per 
head in the same county was +0.53. 
Turning now to the United States, a breakdown of the first 1,527 
account-holders with the New York Bank for Savings lists the occupations of 
over half of them.  They included many unskilled workers  – 143 domestics, 
34 seamstresses, 27 labourers, 20 seamen, 10 boot-cleaners  – but many too in 
white-collar occupations (65 clerks, 14 teachers).  Minors accounted for more 
than one-third of the total.47  Olmstead’s analysis of the socio-economic status 
of new depositors at the Bank for Savings in its early decades implies that a 
higher proportion, about 40-50 per cent, were domestics or labourers, but the 
percentages were lower at the Bowery and the Greenwich.  In Philadelphia in 
mid-century only 16 per cent of male savers were labourers or servants, but 
servants accounted for two-fifths of accounts held by women.  Savings banks 
were definitely more proletarian or blue-collar in the U.S. than in the U.K.  
The Savings Bank of Baltimore described itself in 1818 as ‘founded to 
promote economy and the practice of saving among the poor and labouring 
classes...[and] to afford a secure and profitable mode of investment for small 
sums...to Mechanics, Laborers, Hirelings and others’.48  As in the United 
Kingdom there was a gap between founding principles and how banks were   22
managed in practice.  Some bank trustees tried very hard to restrict the 
benefits of savings banks to the industrious poor by imposing controls on the 
upper limits deposited and by closing or paying no interest on inactive 
accounts.  In Philadelphia in December 1833 the directors of the local savings 
bank resolved to end the practice of receiving deposits ‘by’ one person ‘for’ 
another.  In New York the Bowery savings bank apparently decided at some 
point early in its history to accept deposits only from ‘widows, orphans, 
single women and minors’, but this rule did not last long.  In the early 
decades the Bank for Savings remained truest to the spirit of the movement, 
and repeatedly attempted to limit free riding by well-heeled depositors.49 
 The average amount held per account in New York’s savings banks on 
the eve of the Civil War in nearly all cases exceeded $200 in 1860, a level also 
exceeded in antebellum Baltimore.50  At this time the mean wage of an 
unskilled labourer in New York at this time was about $1-$1.25 per diem or 
$250-$400 per annum.  Clearly many working-class families would have been 
very hard pressed to accumulate savings of $200 in a savings bank.  Yet the 
ratio of the average deposited in New York to the annual unskilled wage—
say, 0.5 to 0.8—was a good deal lower than in Ireland (nearly 2) or England 
and Wales (over 1) in mid-century. 
  The records of our two banks corroborate findings based on other data.  
Irish immigrants living in lower Manhattan formed a majority of the EISB’s 
early customers.  People with proletarian, blue-collar occupations were very 
much to the fore among both male and female account-holders.  Two-fifths of 
the men and two-thirds of the women in our database declared unskilled 
labouring jobs such as ‘labourer’, ‘porter’, ‘charwoman’, or ‘domestic’.  
Another one-third of savers were in semi-skilled or menial occupations 
requiring little or no literacy.  One saver in ten reported a white-collar, 
business, or professional occupation (e.g. teacher, printer, lawyer, merchant, 
clerk, priest), five per cent were housewives or women declaring no   23
occupation, and the remaining three per cent were minors or males declaring 
no occupation.      
Whether the founders of the TSB ever intended to target the poor 
specifically must remain a moot point.  In evidence to the Irish Poor Inquiry51 
in 1835 local clergyman Henry Armstrong, a founding trustee, pronounced it 
‘prosperous’, but added that ‘very few of the lower orders take advantage of 
it’.  The evidence on occupational status in the TSB records is incomplete.  
Clearly, however, the two main unskilled categories, labourers and servants, 
were under-represented.  Domestic servants made up five per cent of account 
holders but twelve per cent of Tipperary’s labour force in 1841 and fifteen per 
cent in 1881.52  Labourers made up half the labour force in 1841, but 
‘labourers’ accounted for only one saver in fifty.  In effect the TSB was a 
farmers’ bank.  Account-holders described as farmers and members of 
farming families accounted for over one account-holder in four, and it is clear 
from addresses in the ledgers that a significant number of  ‘minors’, 
‘spinsters’, ‘widows’, and ‘married women’ were also from farming families. 
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6. CONCLUSION 
There is plenty evidence that the poor and the working classes don’t 
save much.53  Whether nineteenth-century savings banks succeeded in their 
original aim of making the poor more provident is doubtful.  We have seen 
how in the early years at least the new institutions catered disproportionately 
for the more affluent, who took advantage of the generous interest rates on 
offer.  Though obviously some poor people availed of the new banks, the 
lion’s share of the benefits went to relatively comfortable account-holders.  
The fate of the elderly poor, in particular, would remain an abiding policy 
concern.  Almost exactly a century after the launch of the savings bank 
movement, Lloyd George’s Old Age Pensions Act of 1908 amounted to an 
implicit confession that the poor were still incapable of making adequate 
provision for old age through their own savings.54  The savings bank 
movement, fearful that it would crowd out savings, strongly opposed the 
non-contributory old age pension.55  The irony is that savings banks were 
least effective where they were most needed.  In Ireland they had even less 
success in getting the poor to save than across the Irish Sea.  In the United 
States, where living standards were highest, the savings banks were most 
likely to attract the ‘poor’.  Overall, though it would be farfetched to argue 
that the early trustee savings banks did much harm, their contribution to the 
‘security and improvement of the savings of persons in humble life’56 was 
rather limited. 
To the limited extent that they served the poor, the new institutions put 
their savings to more productive use than before.  For the poor the alternative 
would have been, not another savings institution, but a safe hiding place at 
home.  By the same token, the middle-class origins of most deposits imply 
that, in the early years at least, they did not constitute net additions to 
savings.  In Britain the situation changed after 1828, when legislation reduced 
the subsidization of savings banks, prompting the more interest-sensitive 
middle-class depositors to switch their funds elsewhere.  In Ireland the   25
savings banks clung more successfully for a time to middle-class savings.57  
Yet even in Ireland the business of the savings banks was sensitive to the 
interest paid by the joint stock banks and improvements in their facilities.  In 
the United States, where the savings banks came closest to meeting their 







TABLE 1.  THE AGE-DISTRIBUTION OF FIRST-TIME 
DEPOSITORS IN THURLES AND NEW YORK (%) 
 Thurles  EISB 
Less than 20  22.6  4.2 
20-9 19.2  20.1 
30-9 25.7  37.8 
40-9 17.0  23.1 
50-9 11.6  12.3 
60+ 4.0  2.5 
Total 943  407 
Note: the data refer to Thurles 1830-1845 and to New York 1862 
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TABLE 2. SUMS ACCUMULATED IN ACCOUNTS 
OPENED 
 Sums Accumulated ($)  Women (%)    Men    (%) 
       Negative     77   (29)     234   (34) 
        0 – 9.99     66   (25)    144   (21) 
       10-49.99     49   (18)      88   (13) 
       50-99.99     16    (6)     48     (7) 
   100-199.99     20    (8)     66   (10) 
        200 +     38   (14)     99   (15) 
       Total    266    679 
  




   
TABLE 3. OPENING DEPOSITS ($) 
First Deposit ($)      Men   (%)   Women   (%) 
        0  - 9.9         21    (3)        11    (4) 
     10 – 49.9       186   (27)      106   (40) 
     50 – 99.9       151   (22)        72   (27) 
 100 – 199.9       153   (23)        34   (13) 
 200 – 499.9       122   (18)        38   (14) 
   500 +         46    (7)          5     (2) 
   Total       679      266 
   Average         146.8         116.9 
          TABLE 4. EXPLAINING THE VARIATION IN SAVING PATTERNS IN THE EISB IN THE 1850s 
 
 
Number of obs       799      799          799    799   799    799   Mean 
Adj R2       0.4371     0.1156        0.3671   0.364   0.384    0.292   Value 
 
Dependent    CLACCT    STDEPOSIT      TOTALDEP    NODEPS    NOWITHS    SAVED 
Variable 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
variable |       [1]       [2]          [3]      [4]        [5]        [6]        [7] 
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
  female|    -18.117       -41.163 **      -112.74 **            .304      -.831 **    -18.118      .2728 
 jtwwife|     22.686 **      16.046 **       16.018          -.209      -.224      22.686   *    .2591 
 married|     -4.680         .4322         27.123          -.447       .649      -4.680      .5207 
numbchld|     -4.397         2.992         -2.425            .125       .013        -4.397         1.039 
 
 
  outnyc|     88.032 **     41.972 **       112.82 **       -1.691 **    -.208       88.032 *    .0588 
 
 
 laborer|     69.663       -83.967         2.0826          4.150     -1.332      69.663        .5069 
 semiskl|     81.191       -94.743         18.979          4.572 *    -.928      81.191        .3529 
professl|     96.204       -92.588         113.86          5.687 **   -2.430      96.204        .0613 
houswife|     143.10      -76.559          65.547          3.045      -.262      143.10           .0538         
yngmale |     69.986      -93.694        -66.394          3.756     -2.495      69.986         .0200 
 
 
   noram|     -3.725      -47.737           .706         -1.952       .069       -3.725      .0588 
     irl|    -35.696      -117.58 **        -110.22         -3.325 *    1.599    -46.611      .7822 
      gb|    -46.611      -149.39 **       -168.08          -.913      1.770    -35.696           .0576 
     ger|    -30.534      -121.19 **       -79.534         -1.480       .929    -30.534           .0601 
othereur|     -37.68      -107.69 **      -107.08         -1.266      1.335    -37.684           .0275 
 
 
   iryus|      1.679        3.341 **         6.516 **         .007      -.037        1.679           5.948 
   gbyus|     -4.737        7.042 **         5.565           .380 **    -.174 **     -4.737     .4368 
  geryus|      -8.14 *     10.285 **        8.137           .020      -.093      -8.143      .3367 
  euryus|     -1.576        7.245           8.433          -.069      -.092      -1.576      .1176 
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TABLE 4, CONTINUED 
 
Dependent    CLACCT    STDEPOSIT      TOTALDEP    NODEPS    NOWITHS    SAVED 
Variable 
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 





daysopen|       .038 **              .083 **         .001 **     .001 **      0.038 *    1177. 
stdepost|       .817 **                 -.008 **     .005 **    -11.748   *    118.9 
  nodeps|     13.681 **     -5.218 **      20.855 **              .332 **     13.681   *    4.676 
 nowiths|    -11.748 **      5.057 **       1.520            .400 **          -0.185   *    4.854 
 
 
when a variable is a dummy variable dy/dx is for discrete change of its value from 0 to 1 
** => statistically significant at 5%; * => statistically significant at 1% 
 
KEY:  CLACCT=size of account when closed; STDEPOSIT=starting deposit; TOTALDEP=total deposited: NODEPS= 
no. deposits; NOWITHS=no. withdrawals; SAVED=amount saved; jtwwife=joint account with wife; 
numbchld=number of children; outnyc=living outside New York; stdepost=starting deposit; iryus, gbyus, 
euryus, geryus=nationality dummies interacting with years in U.S.; yngmale=young male; noram=born in 
north America; semiskl=semi-skilled  29
TABLE 5.  SAVING PATTERNS IN THE THURLES SAVINGS BANK 1829-1846 
 
Dep. variable   OPBAL   SAVED    MAX    DEPS    WITHDRAWALS       Mean 
AdjR2    0.111   0.017     0.043  0.061    0.046        Value of 
N    2269   2269     2265    2264    2269        Variable 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
variable |      dy/dx          dy/dx      dy/dx    dy/dx         dy/dx        
---------+------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
  thurles|    -1.603 **     2.106 *   -2.746 *    .3409     -.091             .3784     
   female|     2.729 **    .5196      3.068 *    -.217           -.078        .4159      
 
   farmer|    -.3781      -2.563 **    -4.48 **    1.388 **     .1760        .1744       
  farmfam|    -3.239 **    .2552      -3.915     5.112 **       .1979            .1223       
    widow|    -1.938      -.2191       -4.027      .2053     .9287 *       .0336      
  marrfem|     1.628       .2956       .6496       -.580     -.560        .0653       
    minor|     6.176 **   -2.697       9.027 **    -.603     -.759 *       .0861      
  spinstr|     3.819 **   -.1197        2.948      -.459     -.891        .0706      
      lab|    -1.255      -.1898       -4.364       -.150     -1.16 **       .0234     
   clergy|    -7.466 **   -6.229       -15.68 *     3.591 *    1.892 *       .0071      
      ric|     1.104      -5.058      -6.116       -.568     -.566        .0247 
  servant|      1.78 *     1.191       5.863 *     -.135     .5649        .0583      
    loesq|     .9483      -3.351      -.7485       -.842     -.406        .0238      
 
 dateopen|     .0003      -.0013 **   -.0020 **    -.000     -.000       9/1838 
 
    trust|     5.296 **    1.146       4.552 **    -1.78 **    -1.45 **       .4309       
  mintrst|    -4.577 **   12.236 **    1.863      .4524     .0992        .0428       
 spintrst|    -3.642 **    3.1333       -1.103       .8669     .7810        .0309     
 farfamtr|     2.486 *    4.1767        9.998 **    -3.23 **    -.092        .0490      
 
 
** => statistically significant at 5%; * => statistically significant at 1%  30
 
   
 
TABLE 6. OCCUPATIONAL PROFILE OF ACCOUNT HOLDERS, 1852 
 
A.  PERCENTAGE OF DEPOSITS (£) IN EACH OCCUPATIONAL GROUP: 
 England  Wales  Scotland  Ireland 
1. Gentlemen  1.2  2.1  1.0  3.6 
2. Professional men  0.6  0.9  1.4  1.1 
3. Working in education (M+F)  1.2  0.2  0.1  1.5 
4. Tradesmen, small farmers, etc.  26.0  37.8  29.0  43.7 
5. Soldiers, mariners  2.2  2.2  0.6  3.8 
6. Policemen, etc.  0.3  0.0  0.1  0.9 
7. Labourers, servants, journeymen  15.0  13.8  16.6  4.8 
8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)  24.0  17.9  20.3  11.0 
9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female 
artisans 
2.1 0.1  0.4 0.7 
10. Married women, spinsters, widows 13.2  14.5  13.6  19.1 
11. Minors  8.2  5.6  6.6  8.3 
12. Trust accounts  1.5  1.9  0.1  1.0 
13. Misc.  4.6  3.1  10.4  0.6 









B. PERCENTAGE OF ACCOUNTS BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP: 
 England  Wales  Scotland  Ireland 
1. Gentlemen  1.1  2.5  1.2  3.0 
2. Professional men  0.5  1.0  0.8  0.8 
3. Working in education (M+F)  1.0  0.0  0.1  1.5 
4. Tradesmen, small farmers, etc.  23.9  31.7  25.9  40.0 
5. Soldiers, mariners  1.6  2.2  0.5  2.9 
6. Policemen, etc.  0.2       
7. Labouers, servants, journeymen  12.6  15.2  16.3  7.2 
8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. (F)  22.1  20.1  21.3  14.8 
9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, female 
artisans 
2.4 0.1  0.4  1.1 
10. Married women, spinsters, 
widows 
11.1 13.7  13.4  18.2 
11. Minors  16.3  9.9  11.6  8.3 
12. Trust accounts  2.1  1.3  0.1  1.0 
13. Misc.  5.0  2.2  8.4  0.6 
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C. AVERAGE (£) BY OCCUPATIONAL GROUP 
 England  Wales  Scotland  Ireland 
1. Gentlemen  28  22  12  33 
2. Professional me  29  24  24  38 
3. Working in education (M+F)  32  43  15  27 
4. Tradesmen, small farmers, etc. 
(*) 
28 32 16  30 
5. Soldiers, mariners  35  27  17  36 
6. Policemen, etc.  34  33  13  39 
7. Labourers, servants, 
journeymen 
31 24 15  18 
8. Domestic servants, nurses, etc. 
(F) 
30 24 14  20 
9. Dressmakers, shopwomen, 
female artisans 
24 24 15  17 
10. Married women, spinsters, 
widows 
32 28 15  29 
11. Minors  13  15  8  27 
12. Trust accounts  18  18  11  28 
13. Misc.  33  24  18  27 
Total (£)  26  27  14  28 
(*) Tradesmen and their assistants, small farmers, clerks, mechanics, artisans 










TABLE 7. SAVINGS PATTERNS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM, 1850 





  £     s    d 
Average withdrawal 
    £      s    d 
E & W  1.1  0.5    5   17    2     14    2    7½ 
Scotland  1.8  1.0    3   18    0       5    9    4 
Ireland  1.5  1.0    8   15   10½       8    6    8½ 
     Source:    BPP,  1852 
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